(i) the written agreement contains a clear and striking disclosure that informs the person under contract that: an agreement bearing the signature of the named person, which clearly authorizes the seller to send telemarketing ads or messages with an automatic dialer, and the telephone number to which these telemarketing ads or messages may be transmitted. In June 2017, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a consumer could not unilaterally revoke their consent in a negotiated bilateral contract. Reyes v. Lincoln. Fin. Servs., 861 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 2017). The Reyes court based its decision on the law of the “Black Letter” contracts by referring to a fundamental aspect of contractual relations that one party cannot modify or revoke without the consent of the other party. The court found that a consumer who had agreed to be contacted through an automatic voter could not unilaterally revoke the consent without the appellant`s permission.

In particular, the Second Circuit distinguishes the jurisprudence from the third and eleventh circle, in which consumers withdraw their consent because it was issued in the context of credit applications and not under a bilateral contract. Other courts have allowed consumers to revoke contractual consents because nothing in the contract has prevented the consumer from withdrawing consent. See z.B. Rodriguez v. Premier Bankcard, LLC (N.D. Ohio). This issue should not be repeated frequently, as companies are able to address this issue by explicitly stating that consumer consent can only be revoked by mutual agreement between the parties. Moreover, it is generally accepted that the silence of a contract on the issue of revocation is sufficient to allow the non-emerging party to unilaterally deny its contractual obligations.

Indeed, even the doctrine of public order that ambiguities must be interpreted in a treaty against its author involves several reasonable constructions of the treaty; A design that allows a party to unilaterally reject its contractual obligations can hardly be characterized as reasonable. [13] The FCC`s rules define “prior express written consent” and contain specific standards for the “agreement” required to meet the definition. The agreement must: (i) declare that consent applies to a certain number of a particular distributor; (ii) recognize that consent is not necessary for the purchase of goods or services; and (iii) by the customer. 47 C.F.R. 64.1200 (f) (8). In the relevant section, the Consumer Protection by Telephone Act (TCPA) prohibits a caller from making a call via an automatic telephone call (ATDS) via a telephone number assigned to a mobile phone service (except for a call in an emergency or with the prior express consent of the named party). 47 U.S.C No. 227(b)).1)).

In other words, a caller should not use an ATDS to make a call or send a text message to a mobile phone without the recipient`s express consent. The type of consent depends on the nature of the call or text. And while consent can generally be revoked by any reasonable method, some courts have recently considered whether revocation can be restricted in cases where consent is included in a bilateral agreement. In August 2014, Capital One Financial Corp. closed, AllianceOne Receivables Management Inc., Leading Edge Recovery Solutions, LLC and Capital Management Services, L.P. entered into a $75.5 million payment agreement to terminate a consolidated class action pending lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, claiming that the companies were using an automated dialer to call their customers` mobile phones without consent. This is the largest cash billing proposed to date under the TCPA. [19] It should be noted that this remedy was a call for information that is not subject to the “explicit prior written consent obligations” that have applied to telemarketing calls since October 2013. [20] Medley`s case centred on whether the applicant could revoke her prior written consent.