A marriage withholding agreement is different from both a matrimonial brokerage contract and a fiancee contract. The Law Commission has given extensive thought to the Indian Contract Act of 1872 and has proposed several amendments by adding a bill attached to the Commission`s report, in which it proposed the replacement of several sections, including section 26 of the Act, in order to obtain an amendment to the Marriage Limitation Agreements Act. The delegitimization of a trade agreement is part of the history of the conflict between free markets and contractual freedom. Guaranteeing contractual freedom would be tantamount to legitimizeing trade restriction agreements, which would lead the parties to agree to limit competition. According to the Common Law, the current position stems from the contract case- One of the essential conditions for the formation of the contract is that it must not be inequivalent. Section 10 of the Indian Contracts Act states that “all contracts are contracts… which are not expressly cancelled. A contract can be cancelled for several reasons, for example. B brokerage contracts that differ from marriage limitation agreements, which are defined as contracts designed to pay a third party to negotiate, procure or obtain a marriage. It can be said here that marriage mediation prevailed, at least among Hindus, in pre-independent India, as The Hindu Law of Under English Law points out, agreements that limit marriage are discouraged because they undermine population growth and the moral well-being of citizens. Already in 1768, a precedent was introduced by the Court of King`s Bench in Lowe v. Peers, where the accused had made a promise under seal, no one but the promise to marry, on the penalty of paying their 1000 pounds within three months of marriage with someone else. “The restraint of marriage.” Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary, Merriam-Webster, www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/restraint%20%20marriage.

Access 1 Dec 2020. A similar attitude was also adopted in A. Suryanarayana Murthi v. P. Krishna Murthy, in which The Mitwitwens had reached an agreement to lose their share in the deceased husband`s property if they remarried, and this was held a valid contract, as the agreement did not directly limit the marriage. However, years later, Gulab Rani filed a complaint to reclaim ownership of some of that estate, claiming in particular that the contractual compromise act under Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act was null and foregoing because he recognizes the marriage. It should be noted, however, that a violation of Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act of 1872 was not invoked in apex Court by a partial restriction of marriage which, as part of the service contract, existed definitively before the Apex court. Section 26 of the Indian Contract Act is a widespread provision, with only one significant exception. It does not extinguish a partial or absolute agreement on the marriage of a minor. This exception, unlike public policy in general, is to marry a minor and, by the reluctance to commit such acts, the agreement that limits such marriages can instead be characterized as a more important public order. Under the above provisions, Air Hostesses retired from service in the following contingencies: (a) at the age of 35; b) at the time of marriage, if it took place within four years of service, and c) at the first pregnancy. Brokerage contracts have since been denounced by the courts, contrary to public order.

For example, in Gopi Tihadi v. Gokhei Panda and Another, a departmental bank of Orissa High Court stated: “The examination or purpose of an agreement is lawful, unless the law is expressly prohibited or if the court deems it immoral or contrary to public order.